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JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from the Order and Judgment signed on February 26, 2016,

by the Honorable Andrew H. Stone of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County. The
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 21, 2016, and is timely under Utah R. App. P. Rule
4. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4103(2)G).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the district court err when it found a fraudulent transfer from Robert
~

Porenta to Louise Porenta when the requisite debtor/creditor relationship that existed
between Robert and Patricia Porenta, which arose during the underlying divorce action,
terminated upon Robert's death and subsequent abatement of the divorce action?

~

(Preserved at R. 2755-57). 1

Standard of Review: "[Whether a debtor/creditor relationship exists presents
vJ

issues of] mixed questions of fact and law. We review factual questions under the clearly
erroneous standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. Although
questions of law are reviewed for correctness, we may still grant a trial court discretion in

~

~

1

Because the trial court found a fraudulent transfer from Robert to Louise, Louise
assumes, pursuant to Utah case law, that the trial court found that the debtor/creditor
relationship between Robert and Patricia survived the abatement of the divorce action.
See, Widdison v. Widdison, 2014 UT App 233, P6, 336 P.3d 1106 ("When a trial court
fails to make findings on a material issue, we assume the court found them in accord with
its decision, and we affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to
find facts to support it. But we will vacate for further findings when the ambiguity of the
facts makes this assumption unreasonable." (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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its application of the law to a given fact situation.") (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78, ifl0-11, 132 P.3d 63.
Issue 2: Did the district court err when it voided the transfer from Robert to

Louise when the current version of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act only allows a
creditor to recover, to the extent necessary to satisfy a creditor's claim, judgment for the
value of the asset transferred, or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim,
whichever is less? (Preserved at R. 2758-64).
Standard of Review: Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for

correctness, giving no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. See, Estate of
Higley v. DOT, 2010 UT App 143, ,rs, 657 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 ("We review the district
court's interpretation and application of a statute for correctness, affording no deference
~

to the district court's legal conclusion."); See Also, Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 20 IO UT
12, ,r10, 227 P.3d 256 ("A district court's interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw,
which we also review for correctness.").
DETERMINATIVE LAW

Interpretation and application of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, U.C.A. §25-61 et. seq., is determinative in this appeal. Also, the interpretation, comparison, and
application of the current version of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and the 1953
version of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act are determinative in this appeal. The
following pertinent provisions of both statutes are attached as Addendum:

2
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Current Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act:
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§25-6-2(3)-(6)
§25-6-5(1)
§25-6-6
§25-6-8
§25-6-9
§25-6-14

Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act of 1953

v,

Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§25-1-8
§25-1-9
§25-1-11
§25-1-12
§25-1-15
§25-1-16

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt
Lake City Department, Salt Lake County, in favor of Plaintiff Patricia Porenta (hereafter
"Wife"), finding a fraudulent transfer of real property between Wife's late husband,
lJ

Robert Porenta (hereafter "Husband"), and Wife's mother-in-law, Defendant Louise
Porenta (hereafter "Mother"). After finding the transfer to be fraudulent, the trial court

ld>

declared the transfer void and quieted title in Wife's name.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Wife, and Husband (collectively, "the Couple") were married in 1988.
~

(R. 3743). On September 26, 1997, during the course of the marriage, the Couple
purchased as joint tenants the real property located at 4355 Morris Street, Taylorsville,

0JI

UT 84129 (hereafter "the Property"). (R. 0022). After almost seventeen years of
marriage, the Couple experienced marital problems. (R. 3573) During October, 2005,
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the Couple discussed selling the Property to cover marital debt, (R. 3571), and Husband
moved out of the Property the same month. (R. 3573). On November 10, 2005, Wife
filed for divorce from Husband. (R. 2843). The divorce case was assigned civil number
054906216. (R. 0003).
The disposition of the Property was at issue during the divorce case. (R. 0004).
On October 3rd, 2006, Husband filed in the divorce court a document captioned Rule
10 I (g) Countermotion wherein he asked the divorce court for "an order requiring the
parties to list and sell the marital home, with net proceeds from the sale to be held in
escrow pending further court order or written joint agreement." (R. 0037).
Seven days later, on October 10, 2006, Husband executed a Quit Claim Deed
wherein he transferred 99/100th part of his half of the Property to Mother as tenants in
common, and transferred the remaining 11100th part of his half of the Property to himself
and Mother as joint tenants. (R. 0018, 2843). The Quit Claim Deed was duly recorded
on October 11, 2006, with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. (R. 0018).
On October 17, 2006, seven days after executing the Quit Claim Deed, Husband
filed in the divorce court a document captioned Rule 101 (g) Reply Memorandum in
Support of Countermotion. (R. 0040). In that document, Husband stated:
3. Listing and selling the marital home. Once the home is listed,
either side has the option of buying it. This will allow the market to
establish the value. If petitioner wants the house, she can buy it.
Proceeds can then be paid into escrow pending equitable division or
by a court order. (R. 0041).
On October 19, 2006, the divorce court held a hearing regarding Husband's Rule
101 (g) Countermotion. (R. 0045). The Couple was present at that hearing. (R. 0045).

4
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At that hearing, Husband never mentioned that he executed the Quit Claim Deed on
October 10, 2006, nor that he retained only a 1/100 part of his share of the property. (R.
0006). His position continued to be that he desired the Property be sold and the proceeds
held in escrow. (R. 0006). After the transfer, Husband continued to represent to Wife
and the divorce court that the property was still within the jurisdiction of the divorce
court. (R. 2844). At no point during the divorce proceedings did Husband disclose that
he had made the transfer despite the fact that property distribution remained an issue
before the court and Husband continued to represent that the property would be available
~

for division or allocation at trial. (R. 2844). As a result, the divorce court reserved for
trial the issue of selling the Property unless there was a danger of loss of the property.
(R. 0045, 0052). Husband's October 24, 2006, Objection to the court's ruling reaffirmed
his desire to have the Property sold and the proceeds held in escrow. (R. 0008). Because
of Husband's position to sell the marit~l home and divide the equity, the divorce court
never issued an order restraining the parties from transferring marital assets during the
divorce (R. 1443, 3583).
Child support was also an issue in the divorce case. (R. 0045, 2843). At the same
October 19, 2006, hearing, the divorce court entered judgment against Husband for child
support arrears in the amount of $1,029. (R. 0049). The divorce court also entered
judgment against Husband for $765.60 for unpaid health insurance premiums for the
Couple's minor children and $1,788.12 for unpaid medical expenses. (R. 0049-50). The
judgments were reduced to an Order and signed by the divorce court on November 2,
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2006. (R. 0048-53). This Order was entered into the Registry of Judgments on
November 3, 2006. (R. 00048).
At the time of the transfer, the Couple's debts included a $66,000 mortgage on the
Property and $40,000 in marital debt. (R. 2846).
Husband died on September 9, 2008, in the middle of the divorce action. (R.
0020, 3579-80). Wife, however, did not learn of Husband's death until October 15, 2008.
(R. 3580). Ironically, on October 15, 2008, the divorce court conducted another hearing
wherein it awarded Wife judgment for $5,339.00 for back child support, $1,597.42 for
the children's health insurance premiums, and $9,567.49 for the children's medical
expenses. (R. 0008-09, 3580-81, 3599-600). Total judgments against Husband totaled
$20,086.63. (R. 0009).

2

While it is unclear exactly when Wife discovered that Husband executed the Quit
Claim Deed, Wife knew about the transfer before Husband died. (R. 3537). As a result
of Husband's death, the divorce court, pursuant to well-settled case law, dismissed the
divorce case for lack of jurisdiction, (R. 3606-07), and Wife was never awarded a final
Decree of Divorce. (R. 3586).
On November 6, 2008, two months after Husband died, Wife initiated this action
by filing a complaint against Mother. (R. 0001- 55). In her Complaint, Wife alleged a

2

Wife's Complaint indicates that total ''judgments" against Husband totaled
$20,086.63 through June, 2008, which is before Husband died on September 9, 2008.
However, Wife's trial testimony indicates that the last "judgment" resulted from a
hearing on October 15, 2008, after Husband died, and it was at this hearing that the
judgments against Husband were "totaled". (R. 3599). There is nothing in the record
that indicates a June, 2008 hearing was conducted awarding judgments against Husband.
6
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fraudulent transfer of the Property from Husband to Mother under U.C.A. §25-6-5, §256-6(1), and §25-6-6 (2). (R. 0009, 2333-35). 3 In her prayer for relief, Wife prayed the
trial court t.o find the transfer from Husband to Mother a fraudulent transfer, declare the
transfer void, and quiet title in Wife's name alone. (R. 0014-15).
A bench trial was commenced on September 24, 2014. (R. 3460). The trial was
continued to January 6, 2015, after Mother experienced health issues during the first trial.
(R. 3512, 3527). At trial, Wife argued that her claim against Husband arose when she
threatened divorce in October and not necessarily when she filed for divorce in
(@

November. (R. 2770). She argued her claim against Husband was an equitable allocation
of the marital assets (R. 2648) and not based upon any orders or judgments of the divorce
court (R. 2637). She reasoned that because her creditor status accrued before she filed
for divorce, abatement of the divorce action upon Husband's death had no affect on her
creditor status. (R. 3467). In her Post-Trial Brief, however, Wife admitted that the
divorce court never made an allocation of the marital assets. (R. 2648). Mother, on the

3

In her initial Complaint, Wife alleged the following cause of action: (1) Quite
Title-Fraudulent Transfer under U.C.A. §25-6-5, (2) Quiet Title-Fraudulent Conveyance,
(3) Quiet Title-Conditional Delivery of Quit Claim Deed, (4) Quiet Title-Lack of
Consideration, Defective Deed, and (5) Constructive Trust. (R. 0009-13). Before trial, it
became clear to Mother that Wife's new counsel was attempting to convert her second
cause of action, Fraudulent Conveyance, into a fraudulent transfer claim under U.C.A.
§25-6-6. Mother fi]ed a Motion in Limine asking the trial court to bar Wife from
attempting to prove a fraudulent transfer claim under U.C.A. §25-6-6, arguing that claim
was not pled with particularity. (R. 1814-26). The trial court denied Mother's Motion in
Limine effectively ruling that Wife's second cause of action sufficiently pled fraudulent
transfer under U.C.A. §25-6-6. (R. 1873). At trial, Wife attempted to prove a fraudulent
transfer under both U.C.A. §25-6-5 and 25-6-6. She did not attempt to prove her
Conditional Delivery of Quit Claim Deed, Defective Deed-Lack of Consideration, or
Constructive Trust theories.
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other hand, argued the abatement of the divorce case upon Husband's death also
terminated any debtor/creditor relationship that existed between the Couple. (R. 3467).
Mother also argued that the current Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act no longer allowed a
creditor to set aside the transfer but only allowed a creditor to obtain judgment to the
extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim. (R. 2758).
Also at trial, Wife argued that the transfer from Husband to Mother was fraudulent
because it was designed to remove the property from the jurisdiction of the divorce court
so that Mother and Husband's divorce attorney could share the Property's value. (R.
2642). Mother argued that the transfer was repayment of monies loaned to the Couple
during the course of their marriage, including a $35,000 balance on a loan from Mother
to the Couple to make the initial purchase of the Property. (R. 2845, 3635-38).
On May 6, 2015, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. (R. 2840). The trial court made the following pertinent Findings of Fact: Finding
of Fact 3: that a debtor/creditor relationship arose between the Couple with Wife's filing
of the divorce action (R. 2843); Findings of Fact 8, 9, and 18: Mother provided no
evidence of her purported loans to the Couple during their marriage (R. 2844, 45).
The trial court also made the following Conclusions of Law: Conclusion 1: A
creditor-debtor relationship existed between Husband and Plaintiff at the time of the
Transfer (R. 2851 ); Conclusion 2: The creditor-debtor relationship, and Plaintiff's claim
against Husband, arose when Plaintiff filed for divorce on November 10, 2005 (R. 2851);
Conclusions 6, 7, and 8: The transfer was a fraudulent transfer under U.C.A. §25-6-5,
U.C.A. §25-6-6(1), and U.C.A. §25-6-6(2), respectively, (R. 2852-53); Conclusion 10:
8
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~

Wife's claim against Husband during the divorce at the time of the transfer encompassed
the whole of the marital estate, including the right to preserve the joint tenancy or require
Husband to convey his interest free and clear to Wife (R. 2853-54); Conclusion 10: If not

for the fraudulent transfer, the joint. tenancy of Husband an<l lWifeJ would not have been
severed and fWife] would hav~ b~t.:ome sole owner of the subject property upon
Husband's death. (R. 2853). Conclusions 12, 13: Mother's defenses were meritless,
~

without basis in law or fact, and brought in bad faith (R. 2854); and Conclusion 15:
Mother should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for attorney fees incurred in prosecution
~

of this case and in defense against Mother's counterclaim (R. 2855).
On February 26, 2016, the trial court issued its Order and Judgment. (R. 3407).
The trial court ordered that the Property's title be quieted in Wife's name alone. (R.
3408). The trial court also granted Wife judgment in the amount of $61, 168.50 for had
faith litigation in the fraudulent transfer case. (R. 3408-09).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves the interplay between Utah divorce case law and the Utah
Fraudulent Transfer Act's {UFTA) requirement of a debtor/creditor relationship. UFT A
case law holds that, in a divorce context, a debtor/creditor relationship arises between
husband and wife with the mere threat of divorce. Utah divorce case law holds that when
a party to a divorce action dies during the pendency of the divorce and before a final
Decree of Divorce is awarded, the divorce case abates, along with any interlocutory
orders issued by the divorce court, and the divorce court loses jurisdiction over the
divorce. There is no case law, how~ver, addressing the viability of the debtor/creditor
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~

relationship when the divorce action abates upon the death of one of the parties to the
divorce, and the trial court never addressed this in either its Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law. Mother argues that when Husband died during the divorce action,
any creditor status Wife enjoyed during the divorce action died with him because any
right to payment from Husband which Wife may have been entitled to in the divorce
abated when the divorce action abated upon Husband's death.
This case also involves statutory interpretation of the UFTA; specifically, the
remedies available under the current version of the UFTA. The trial court, having found
the transfer from Husband to Mother fraudulent, voided the transfer, setting it aside
entirely, and quieted title in Wife's name. Mother argues that a comparison of the 1953
version of the UFTA with the current version of the UFTA clearly shows that voiding the
transfer is no longer an available remedy under the current UFTA. Instead of voiding the
transfer, the current UFTA only allows a creditor to satisfy her claim, or right to payment,
by obtaining a judgment either for the value of the asset transferred, or for the amount
necessary to satisfy her claim, whichever is les·s. Thus, having found the transfer
between Husband and Mother fraudulent, the trial court should not have completely set
aside the transfer, but should have awarded Wife judgment against Mother to the extent
necessary to satisfy her right to payment based on the value of the property transferred, or
the amount of Wife's right to payment, whichever is less.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND A FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER BETWEEN HUSBAND AND MOTHER BECAUSE ANY
DEBTOR/ CREDITOR RELATIONSffiP THAT EXISTED BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE DIVORCE
ACTION TERMINATED UPON HUSBAND'S DEATH AND
SUBSEQUENT ABATEMENT OF THE DIVORCE ACTION.
A. The Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act Requires the Existence of a
Debtor/Creditor Relationship Before or After a Transfer is Made and at
the Time of Filing a Fraudulent Transfer Claim under the Act.

"For the UFTA to apply, the statute requires a creditor-debtor relationship." Tolle
v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78,113, 132 P.3d 63 (quoting Bradfordv. Bradford, 1999 UT

App 373, 118, 993 P.2d 887) ("A fraudulent transfer in Utah first requires a debtorcreditor relationship."). Additionally, "The existence of a debt is a requirement for
bringing a fraudulent conveyance action ...." Tolle, 2006 UT App 114.
Depending on the debtor's intent and actions, a debtor/creditor relationship can
arise either before or after a transfer of property is made or an obligation is incurred. See,
~

U.C.A. §25-6-5(1) ("A transfer made or ooligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as
to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or

0j

the obligation was incurred, ..."); U.C.A. §25-6-6(1) ("A transfer made or obligation
incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred if: ..."); and U.C.A. §25-6-6(2) ("A transfer
made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was
made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, ... ").

0P
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The UFTA defines "creditor" as "a person who has a claim." U.C.A. §25-6-2(4).
The Act defines "claim" as, "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." U.C.A. §25-6-2(3). The Act also

~

defines "debtor" as "a person who is liable on a claim," U.C.A. §25-6-2(6), and "debt"
as "liability on a claim." U.C.A. §25-6-2(5). "Because the UFTA is remedial in nature,
the Utah Supreme Court has held that the statute should be liberally construed." Tolle,
2006 Ut App at if l 3, (internal quotations omitted).
While a debtor/creditor relationship can arise either before or after a transfer of
property is made, the two rule statements in Tolle, ("For the UFTA to apply, the statute
requires a creditor-debtor relationship," and "The existence of a debt is a requirement for
bringing a fraudulent conveyance action ... "), indicate the debtor/creditor relationship
must also exist at the time the alleged creditor files his or her fraudulent transfer action.
Additionally, the present tense of the verb "has" in the statutory definition of "creditor",
and the present tense of the verb "is" in the statutory definition of "debtor" also indicates
there must be both a creditor and a debtor at the time a supposed creditor files a
fraudulent transfer action. Thus, a more correct statement of the rule is, "For the UFTA
to apply, the stature requires a creditor-debtor relationship either before or after the
transfer is made and at the time the fraudulent transfer case is filed."
This synthesized statement of the rule is supported by Judge Thome in his
concurring opinion to Tolle. In his concurring opinion to Tolle, Judge Thome stated, "In
a UFTA action, a plaintiff is entitled to relief if she can establish creditor status in several
12
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respects. The UFTA plaintiff herself must have some current claim against the

grantor . .. as it is only the need to satisfy that claim that justifies revesting the
property in the grantor." Id. at 146. Judge Thome then quoted the 1963 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals case Laidley v. Heigho, 326 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 1963), 1963 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3435, wherein that court stated, "the statute does not contemplate the absurdity of
granting [reconveyance] where, as here, judgment cannot be obtained against the only

party in whom the transferred property could be revested." Tolle, 2006 UT App at
146. Judge Thome then concluded, "if the plaintiff has no currently enforceable claim,
~

she cannot obtain creditor's relief under UFTA." Id See Also, Laidley, at 594, ("In
our judgment, however, when, under California law, these estate proceedings have
resulted in appellants' claim being forever barred, the effect has been to destroy the very

(.;gp

claim of indebtedness upon which appellants rely to establish their status as creditors.
Thus, no longer being creditors, appellants have no right to relief under Civil Code, §
3439.09(a).").

It would indeed be absurd for a person to file a fraudulent transfer action and then
argue the she had, in the past, a right to payment from the defendant, but does not now
have a current right to payment from the defendant. Thus, the UFTA requires a creditordebtor relationship exists before or after the transfer is made and at the time a supposed
41'

creditor files a fraudulent transfer action.
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B. A Debtor/Creditor Relationship Arose Between Husband and Wife with
Wife's Threats and Subsequent Filing for Divorce.
For UFTA purposes, a debtor/creditor relationship can arise through mere
awareness of probable legal action against a person. See, Tolle, 2006 UT App 114.
("Based on the broad definition of a claim under the UFTA and the direction from our
supreme court to construe the statute liberally, we hold that Jeanne was indeed, a creditor
of [Husband], given that [her] claim to the [properties]--although not reduced to
judgment [at the time]--had arisen through recent threats [of civil action].") (citing

Bradfordv. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373,114,993 P.2d 887) and (quoting 37 Am. Jur. 2d
Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers § 3) {"The existence of a debt is a requirement
for bringing a fraudulent conveyance action and generally speaking, the awareness of
probable legal action against a debtor amounts to a debt.").
Specifically in a divorce context, the mere threat of divorce can create a
debtor/creditor relationship between spouses. See, Bradford v. Bradford, I 999 UT App
373, 115-Pl 6, 993 P.2d 887 (holding that Mr. Bradford was a creditor of Mrs. Bradford
given that his claim to the house arose through recent threats of divorce.).
In reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's finding that
a debtor/creditor relationship existed between Husband and Wife, the trial court found
that after seventeen years of marriage, the Couple experienced marital problems. (R.
3573). In October, 2005, one month before she filed for divorce from Husband, the
Couple discussed the pending divorce action and discussed selling the Property to pay
marital debt. (R. 3571). Indeed, Husband moved out of the Property the same month.
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(R. 3573). These facts alone are sufficient to create a debtor/creditor relationship
@

between Husband and Wife. Wife then filed for divorce on November 10, 2005. (R.
2843). The trial court expressly found that a debtor/creditor relationship arose between
Husband and Wife when Wife filed for divorce in November, 2005. (R. 2843).
Thus, at the time of the transfer from Husband to Mother, a debtor/creditor
relationship existed between Husband and Wife due to Wife's recent threats of divorce.
Wife's filing for divorce on November 10, 2005, further established that debtor/creditor
relationship.
C. Husband's Death and Subsequent Abatement of the Divorce Action
Terminated the Debtor Creditor Relationship Between Husband and
Wife.

Even with viewing all the facts in a light most favorable to Wife, there are no set
of facts under which the trial court could have found the debtor/creditor relationship
between Husband and Wife survived the abatement of the divorce as a matter of law.
Whether the debtor/creditor relationship between Husband and Wife was based on
Wife's actual filing for divorce and the interlocutory judgments issued by the divorce
court, or on Wife's threats of divorce, Husband's death and subsequent abatement of the
divorce action terminated any debtor/creditor relationship between Husband and Wife.

vJ

1. Wife's Creditor Status Terminated Upon Abatement of the
Divorce Action.

It is well settled Utah case law that if a party to a divorce action dies before a final

decree of divorce is entered, the divorce action abates, along with any interlocutory
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orders issued by the divorce court, and their status reverts to what it had been before the
action was filed.
"When the death of one or both of the parties occurs after the entry of a divorce
decree and before the decree is final, the decree becomes ineffective and is deemed and
held to be of no further force or effect." Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884, 885-886 (Utah
1975), 1975 Utah LEXIS 665 (emphasis added).

Daly took place at a time when Utah issued interlocutory divorce decrees which
only became final decrees three months after they were first issued by the court. In Daly,
Wife sued Husband for divorce. Id. at 885. In the interlocutory decree, the court
awarded Wife the marital home which was jointly owned by Wife and Husband. Id.
During the three months after the interlocutory decree was issued, and before it became
final, Wife died. Id The Supreme Court in Daly overturned part of the controlling law at
that time. The controlling law was found in In re Harper's Estate which stated:
When the death of one of the parties occurs after the entry of a
divorce decree and before the decree is final the decree becomes
ineffective to dissolve the marriage, death having terminated that
personal relationship. However, the occurrence of death does not
abate the action itself and to the extent that property rights are
determined by the decree it remains effective and becomes final in
the same manner and at the same time as one between living
persons.
In re Harper's Estate, I Utah 2d 296, 298 (Utah 1954), 265 P.2d 1005.

Because In re Harper's Estate was the controlling law at the time, the court
awarded Wife's estate the home. However, the Daly court expressly overruled

16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gv

prospectively the second portion of In re Harper's Estate regarding interlocutory orders
and property rights issued by the divorce court:
At the same time we affirm the award, we hereby reverse
prospectively that part of the decision in In re Harper's Estate,
supra, having tu <lu with determination of property rights, and hereby
order and adjudge that when the death of one or both of the parties
occurs after the entry of a divorce decree and before the decree is
final, the decree becomes ineffective and is deemed and held to
be of no further force or effect.

Daly, P .2d at 885 (emphasis added).
In Nelson v. Davis, the Supreme Court elaborated on what the Daly court held:
In regard to any rights in the property that her mother may have
acquired in the divorce action, the principle announced by this
Court in the case of Daly v. Daly is applicable: that when the death
of one or both parties to a divorce action occurs during the pendency
of the action, the action itself abates and their status, including their
property rights, reverts to what it had been before the action was
filed.

Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 597 (Utah 1979), 1979 Utah LEXIS 821 (emphasis
~

added).
It is important to note that the "property rights" which revert upon abatement of

the divorce action are only those rights "acquired in the divorce action", or, in other
words, those rights granted by the court via an order issued during the divorce. These
rights abate upon death of one of the parties because the court no longer has jurisdiction
over the parties, and without jurisdiction, the court cannot issue a divorce decree. This is
so because one cannot divorce a dead person. See, Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 75 ("There was never a divorce decree in this
case as one cannot divorce a dead person.").

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law17
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Furthermore, when a divorce court loses jurisdiction over an action, any

temporary or interlocutory orders issued by the court die as well. See,

Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969,977 (Utah 1996), 285 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (stating
that after Wife died during the divorce proceeding, "the divorce proceeding, and therefore
the trial court's order [to not sell, mortgage, or encumber the marital home], died with
Mrs. Knickerbocker.") (emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court found a debtor/creditor relationship arose between
Husband and Wife when Wife filed for divorce. (R. 2843, 2851). During the pendency
of the divorce action, Wife had a right to payment from Husband based on the several
judgments awarded to Wife against Husband. (R. 0048-53). Some of these judgments
were even recorded in the Registry of Judgments. (R. 0048). Total judgments, and
Wife's total "right to payment" from Husband for child support and medical and
insurance expenses for the children, both before and after his death, summed to
$20,086.63. (R. 0009). However, according to Knickerbocker, these judgments, or
"rights to payment," died when Husband died; and according to Nelson, the divorce
action itself abated, and any rights to child support or medical or insurance payments
from Husband Wife may have acquired in the divorce action abated with the divorce
action. Thus, at the time Wife filed her fraudulent transfer claim against Mother, there
was no debtor/creditor relationship between Husband and Wife because Wife did not
have a right to payment from Husband because any right to payment she acquired during
the divorce action abated when the divorce action itself abated.
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Despite this, Wife argues that her creditor status survived the abatement of the
divorce action because, according to Nelson, when a divorce abates upon death of one of
the parties, the parties' status reverts to what it had been before the action was filed.
<:ii

Wife argues that her creditor status arose in October, one month before she filed for
divorce on November 10, 2005, and that the abatement of the divorce action returned her
to the status she enjoyed on November 9, 2005, specifically, Husband' creditor.

~

This argument fails because as Judge Thorne stated in Tolle, "The UFT A plaintiff
herself must have some current [right to payment] against the grantor ... as it is

~

only the need to satisfy that claim that justifies revesting the property in the granter ...
. Tf the plaintiff has no currently enforceable claim, she cannot obtain creditor's relief

under UFTA." Tolle, 2006 UT App 146. Even if Wife's creditor status survived
abatement of the divorce action, she has no currently enforceable claim against Husband.
No matter how hard she tries, Wife cannot haul Husband back into the divorce court to
enforce her right to payment because Husband is dead and the divorce court cannot
obtain jurisdiction over him. As the Farrell court stated, "One cannot divorce a dead
person." Farrell, 830 P.2d at 302.
As a result, the debtor/creditor relationship that existed between Husband and
Wife from the underlying divorce case ceased to exist when the divorce case abated upon
Husband's death.

0t>
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2. Husband's Debtor Status Terminated Upon Abatement of the
Divorce Action.
Similarly, Husband is no longer Wife's debtor. U.C.A. 25-6-2(6) defines a debtor
as, "a person who is liable on a claim." In order for there to be a debtor, there must be a
claim for which the debtor is liable. When Husband died and the divorce case abated, he

~

ceased being a debtor of Wife. He no longer owed Wife child support nor had any
obligation to pay Wife anything for their children's medical treatments or insurance.
Such parental obligations became hers alone to bear. As argued above, Wife cannot
bring Husband back into the divorce court because the divorce court does not have
jurisdiction over him. Thus, Husband was no longer Wife's debtor when Wife filed her

~

fraudulent transfer claim against Mother. Because there was no debtor/creditor
relationship when Wife filed her claim, the district court erred when it found a fraudulent

'1ii.J

transfer between Husband and Mother.
Ultimately, the UFTA requires a debtor/creditor relationship not only before or
after a transfer is made, but also when the supposed creditor files her claim under the
UFTA. While Wife's debtor/creditor relationship with Husband was established when
she threatened and subsequently filed for divorce, Husband's death during the pendency
of the divorce terminated not only Wife's creditor status but also Husband's debtor status.
Thus, Wife cannot find relief under the UFTA because there was no debtor/creditor
relationship with Husband or anyone else when she filed her claim. As a result, this
Court should reverse the trial court's finding of a fraudulent transfer between Husband
and Mother.

20
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION TO SET ASIDE THE TRANSFER
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE CURRENT VERSION OF THE
UTAH FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT ONLY ALLOWS A CREDITOR
TO OBTAIN A JUDGMENT IN AN AMOUNT NECESSARY TO SATISFY
THE CREDITOR'S RIGHT TO PAYMENT.
The district court, having found the transfer from Husband to Mother fraudulent,

~

voided the transfer, setting it aside completely, and quieting title in Wife's name.
Unfortunately, completely setting aside the transfer is not an available remedy under the
current version of the UFTA. The current version of the UFTA now only allows a
creditor ultimately to obtain a judgment in an amount necessary to satisfy her right to
~

payment based on the value of the property transferred or the value of her claim,
whichever is less.
A. Completely Setting Aside A Transfer ls No Longer An Available Remedy
Under The Current Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act.
"[The] primary responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the
intent of the Legislature." Christensen v. Industrial Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah
1982), 1982 Utah LEXIS 906 "Ordinarily, when the Legislature amends a statute, the
supposition is that it meant to change the law in the respects amended as compared to

~

what it was before the amendment, and not that it simply meant to clarify or remove an
ambiguity." Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 456 (Utah 1935), 46 P.2d 400.
"A well-established canon of statutory construction provides that where a
legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions unamended, or reenacts them without change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior
judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have adopted them
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as consistent with its own intent." Christensen, 642 P.2d at 756. When the Legislature
makes changes to a statute, a court "must assume that [the] changes [are] deliberate."
Rocky Mountain Helicopter v. Carter, 652 P.2d 893,896 (Utah 1982), 1982 Utah LEXIS
1014.

Cfv

When interpreting a statute, the courts "do not view individual words and
subsections in isolation; instead, our statutory interpretation requires that each part or
section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole." State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, P29, 309 P.3d 209.
In 1953, Utah had a Fraudulent Transfer Act. See, U.C.A. §25-1-1 et. seq. (1953).
In 1988, the Legislature amended the 1953 version of the UFTA and completely disposed
of a creditor's ability to void, or set aside, a fraudulent transfer. A comparison of the
1953 UFTA and the current UFTA makes this very clear.
Section 25-1-8 of the old statute compared to Section 25-6-5(1) of the new statute:

OLD: 25-1-8. When conveyance or assignment void. Every
conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any estate or
interest in lands, or in goods or things in action, or of rents or profits
issuing therefrom, and every charge upon lands, goods or things in
action or upon the rents or profits thereof, made with intent to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors or other persons, of their lawful
suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, and every bond or
other evidence of debt given, suits commenced, or decree or
judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the person
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be void.
NEW: 25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer -- Claim arising before or after transfer.
( 1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent
as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made
the transfer or incurred the obligation:

22
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(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the debtor; or
The 1953 UFTA declared void any transfer made with intent to defraud. The
current statute declares the same transfer as merely "fraudulent" and completely disposes
of the term "void". Even the section headings indicate the legislature's intent to now
declare a fraudulent transfer "fraudulent" and not "void."
Section 25-1-15 compared to Section 25-6-8(1)(a) and (b) and Section 25-6-8(2):

OLD: 25-1-15. Rights of creditors with matured claims. Where
a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such
creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any other
person, except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge
of the fraud at the time of the purchase or one who has derived title
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser:
( 1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to
the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or,
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy execution
upon, the property conveyed.
~

NEW: 25-6-8. Remedies of creditors. (1) In an action for relief
against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject
to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;

CJj

(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the
asset transferred or other property of the transferee in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the
debtor, the creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the
asset transferred or its proceeds.
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Here, the 1953 UFTA allowed creditors with matured claims to "have the
conveyance set aside or obligation annulled." The current statute disposes of this

Gw

language and now allows for "avoidance" of the transfer or obligation. (U.C.A. §25-69(2) defines "avoidance" as ''judgment for the value of the asset transferred ... , or the
amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less." This will be
discussed in more detail below.).
Similarly, the 1953 UFTA allows a creditor to "disregard the conveyance" and
attach or levy execution. Again, the current statute completely removes the "disregard
the conveyance" language but retains the attachment portion of the remedy.
Additionally, Section 25-6-8(2) limits a creditor's remedy, who already has a judgment
against the debtor, to forcing a sale of the asset through levy and execution. It does not
~

allow the creditor to undo the transfer.
Section 25-1-16 compared to Section 25-6-8(l)(c):

OLD: 25-1-16. Rights of creditors with claims not matured.
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to
a creditor whose claim has not matured, he may proceed in a court of
competent jurisdiction against any person against whom he could
have proceeded, had his claim matured, and the court may;
( 1) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property;
(2) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property;
(3) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or,
(4) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may
reqmre.

NEW: 25-6-8(1 )(c). Remedies of creditors. (I) In an action for
relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor,
subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
24 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance
with applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor
or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other
property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset
transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
Here, the intent of the legislature to do away with "voiding" the transfer is quite
apparent. Suh-elements 25-1-16 ( 1), (2), and (4) are almost verbatim of sub-elements 256-8(1 )(c)(i), (ii), and (iii), yet sub-element (3) of 25-1-16, "set aside the conveyance or
annul the obligation" is completely missing in the new statute.
It is even more important to note that Section 25-1-16 contained both a provision
to "set aside the conveyance" and to "make any other order which the circumstances of
the case require." Because these are two separate provisions, one cannot logically
conclude that "make any other order which the circumstances of the case require" means
"setting aside the conveyance."
Section 25-1-11 compared to Section 25-6-14(3),(4):

OLD: 25-1-11. Trust for grantor void. All deeds, gifts,
conveyances, transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods,
chattels, or things in action made in trust for the use of the person
making them shall be void as against the existing or subsequent
creditors of such person.
NEW: 25-6-14. Asset Protection Trust. (3)
If the settler of
an irrevocable trust is also a beneficiary of the trust, and if the
requirements of Subsection (5) are satisfied, a creditor of the settlor
may not:
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(a) satisfy a claim or liability of the settlor in either law or equity
out of the settler's transfer to the trust or the settlor's beneficial
interest in the trust;
(b) force or require the trustee to make a distribution to the
settler, as beneficiary; or
(c) require the trustee to pay any distribution directly to the
creditor, or otherwise attach the distribution before it has been
paid or delivered by the trustee to the settlor, as beneficiary.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), nothing in this section prohibits
a creditor from satisfying a claim or liability from the distribution
once it has been paid or delivered by the trustee to the settlor, as
beneficiary.
Here, the 1953 UFTA allowed a creditor to void a transfer by a debtor into a trust
for the benefit of the debtor. In contrast, the current statute expressly states that a creditor
cannot gain access to the trust property or force a distribution to either the creditor or
debtor. In other words, the creditor cannot void the property transfer into the trust
property. Instead, the creditor must wait until a distribution is voluntarily paid to the
debtor. Only then can the creditor attempt to satisfy his claim.
Sections 25-1-12 and 25-1-9 of the 1953 UFTA are not found in, nor have a
directly corresponding section to, the current UFTA. These sections contain the word
"void" a total of three times. On the other hand, the current UFTA contains the word
"void" only once in Section 25-6-14(5)(£), and it does not relate to a transfer or
obligation. Section 25-6-14(5)(f) states, "An agreement or understanding, express or
implied, between the settlor and the trustee that attempts to grant or permit the retention
of greater rights or authority than is stated in the trust instrument is void."

26
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It is apparent from the Legislature's dramatic changes in the UFTA that the
Legislature meant to change the law regarding a creditor's remedies in a fraudulent
transfer case by denying a creditor the ability to have the transfer set aside. The
Legislature made these changes because it was not satisfied with the current law or prior
judicial construction of the law, and the courts cannot re-insert into the statute that which
the Legislature has deliberately removed. See, People v. Douglass, 5 Utah 283 (Utah
1887), 14 P. 801 ("Dare any ofus say that the legislature can not be so severe in its
punishment? Certainly not, we must all admit that it can. We have nothing whatever to do
<iw

with that. The legislative prerogative is to make such laws as it sees proper, so long as
they are constitutional. The courts construe them, and must inflict the prescribed
punishments. The courts cannot legislate, nor can the assemblies adjudicate.").
B. A Creditor May Now Only Obtain A Judgment To The Extent Necessary
To Satisfy Her Right To Payment.
Section 25-6-8(l)(a) clearly defines the ultimate remedy for creditors. This
section reads,
In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this
chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may
obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary
to satisfy the creditor's claim
Section 25-6-9(2) then defines "avoidance." Section 25-6-9(2) states:

~

Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a
transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 256-8( l )(a), the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the
asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsection (3), or the amount
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necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The
judgment may be entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit
the transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee
who took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
These two sections clearly indicate that a creditor's ultimate remedy is to obtain a
judgment in an amount necessary to satisfy her right to payment, no more, and no less.
This judgment can even follow the property to any subsequent transferee other than a
good faith transferee, thus negating the need to set aside the transfer.
Additionally, "If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the
asset transferred, the judgment shall be for an amount equal to the value of the asset
at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may require." U.C.A. §256-9(3). In other words, even if the creditor's claim was equal to the value of the property
transferred, and it would be easier to undo the transfer, the current statute only allows for
a judgment for the value of the property (subject to adjustment as the equities may
require). It does not allow the transfer to be undone.
Thus, under the current UFTA, a creditor's ultimate remedy is to obtain a
judgment in an amount necessary to satisfy her right to payment, and that judgment is
based upon the value of the asset transferred or the value of her claim, whichever is less.
Because this is the only ultimate remedy available to Wife, the district court erred when it
set aside the transaction and quieted title in her name. As a result, this Court should
reverse the trial court's order setting aside the transfer.
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C. The Value of Wife's Right to Payment is Zero.
U.C.A. §25-6-8{l){a) allows a creditor to obtain "avoidance of the transfer or
obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim." It is important to note
that this and all remedies provided by the statute are "subject to the limitations in Section
25-6-9." U.C.A. §25-6-9(2) defines "voidable" as a "judgment for the value of the asset
transferred ... or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less."
Because a creditor is entitled to a judgment for the lesser of two values, logic dictates that
one must establish those values.
~

In this case, the value of Plaintiffs claim, or right to payment, is zero because the
divorce case abated, along with all interlocutory orders, when Husband died. Wife
simply does not have an enforceable right to payment from Husband.
Not only did the divorce case abate, but the divorce court never determined how it
would have allocated the marital assets. In her Post-Trial Brief, Wife stated, "Plaintiff's
claim against Husband was a marital allocation, the amount to be determined by the
divorce court using equitable principals. Defendant is wrong in assuming that Plaintiff's
interest was 50%, as the equitable allocation was not determined in the divorce." (R.
2648).
Thus, Plaintiff cannot prevail in her claim because the value of her right to
payment is zero, and a judgment for zero dollars is no right to payment at all.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
This Court should set aside the trial court's finding of a fraudulent transfer from
Husband to Mother because the requisite debtor/creditor relationship between Husband
and Wife did not exist at the time Wife filed her fraudulent transfer claim against Mother
under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act. A debtor/creditor relationship existed between
Husband and Wife during the underlying divorce action, but Husband's death during the
pendency of the divorce action and its subsequent abatement terminated that
debtor/creditor relationship. As a result, the requirement that a debtor/creditor
relationship exist at the time a supposed creditor files a claim under the Utah Fraudulent
Transfer Act was not met when Wife filed her claim against Mother.
If this Court finds the transfer from Husband to Mother is not fraudulent, Mother
seeks an order from this Court declaring there was no fraudulent transfer between
Husband and Mother and an order from this Court vacating the trial court's Order and
Ruling quieting title in Wife's name, which would result in Wife owning half of the
Property and Mother, or her subsequent assigns, owning the other half.
If this Court finds a fraudulent transfer between Husband and Mother, then this
Court should set aside the trial court's order setting aside the transfer and quieting title in
Wife's name because the current Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act does not allow for that
remedy. A comparison of the 1953 version of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act with the
current Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act clearly shows that the Legislature removed the
remedy of voiding the transfer. Now, the current Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act only
allows a creditor to obtain a judgment in an amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's
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claim or right to payment. Because Wife's claim is based on mooted divorce
proceedings, her right to payment is zero, and a judgment for zero dollars is no judgment
at all.

If this Court finds the transfer from Husband to Mother is fraudulent, Mother
seeks an order from this Court vacating the trial court's Order and Ruling quieting title in
Wife's name alone, which would result in Wife owning half of the Property and Mother,
or her subsequent assigns, owning the other half.

DATED THIS 13th day of July, 2016.

Stephen A. Starr
Attorney for Louise Porenta
Defendant and Appellant

Gj
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A. Addendum A: Current Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act
@

Utah Code Ann. §25-6-2. Definitions.

In this chapter:
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.

(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.

0P
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Utah Code Ann.§ 25-6-5(1). Fraudulent transfer -- Claim arising before or after
transfer.
(I) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or
the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation:

~

(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor;
or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or

(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.

~

~
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25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer -- Claim arising before transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if:

Gd)

(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation; and
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of
the transfer or obligation.

{4JJ

(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose
before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an
antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.

0J
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25-6-8. Remedies of creditors.

(I) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a
creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy
the creditor's claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred
or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with
applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred
or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its
proceeds.
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25-6-9. Good faith transfer.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a transfer or obligation is not
voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a) against a person who took in good faith
and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or
obligee.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1)(a), the creditor may
recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever
is less. The judgment may be entered against: ·
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the
transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who took
for value or from any subsequent transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset
transferred, the judgment shall be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at
the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may require.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in this section, notwithstanding the voidability
of a transfer or an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee
is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation,
to:
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;

0J

(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
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25-6-14. Asset Protection Trust.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Creditor" means:
(i) a creditor or other claimant of the settlor existing when the trust
is created; or
(ii) a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, including,
whether or not reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured:
(A) one holding or seeking to enforce a judgment entered by
a court or other body having adjudicative authority; or
(B) one with a right to payment.
(b) "Property" means real property, personal property, and interests in real
or personal property.
(c) "Settlor" means a person who transfers property in trust.
(d) "Transfer" me·ans any form of transfer of property, including gratuitous
transfers, whether by deed, conveyance, or assignment.
(e) "Trust" has the same meaning as in Section 75-1-201.
(2) "Paid and delivered" to the settlor, as beneficiary, does not include the settlor's
use or occupancy of real property or tangible personal property owned by the trust
if the use or occupancy is in accordance with the trustee's discretionary authority
under the trust instrument.
(3) If the settlor of an irrevocable trust is also a beneficiary of the trust, and if the
requirements of Subsection ( 5) are satisfied, a creditor of the settlor may not:
(a) satisfy a claim or liability of the settlor in either law or equity out of the
settlor's transfer to the trust or the settlor's beneficial interest in the trust;
(b) force or require the trustee to make a distribution to the settlor, as
beneficiary; or
(c) require the trustee to pay any distribution directly to the creditor, or
otherwise attach the distribution before it has been paid or delivered by the
trustee to the settlor, as beneficiary.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), nothing in this section prohibits a creditor
from satisfying a claim or liability from the distribution once it has been paid or
delivered by the trustee to the settlor, as beneficiary.
(5) In order for Subsection (3) to apply, the conditions in this Subsection (5) shall
be satisfied. Where this Subsection (5) requires that a provision be included in the
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trust instrument, no particular language need be used in the trust instrument if the
meaning of the trust provision otherwise complies with this Subsection (5).
(a) The trust instrument shall provide that the trust is governed by Utah law
and is established pursuant to this section.
(b) The trust instrument shall require that at all times at lea~t one trnstee
shall be a Utah resident or Utah trust company, as the term "trust company"
is defined in Section 7-5-1.

~

(c) The trnst instrument shall provide that neither the interest of the settlor,
as beneficiary, nor the income or principal of the lrusl may be volunt'lrily or
involuntarily transferred by the settlor, as beneficiary. The provision shall
be considered to be a restriction on the transfer of the settlor's beneficial
interest in the trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law
within the meaning of Section 541 (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) The settlor may not have the ability under the trust instrument to
revoke, amend, or terminate all or any part of the trust, or to withdraw
property from the trust, without the consent of a person who has a
substantial beneficial interest in the trust, which interest would be adversely
affected by the exercise of the power held by the settlor.
(e) The trust instrument may not provide for any mandatory distributions
of either income or principal to the settlor, as beneficiary, except as
provided in Subsection (7)(f).

0P

(f) The settlor may not benefit from, direct a distribution of, or use trust
property except as stated in the trust instrument. An agreement or
understanding, express or implied, between the settlor and the trustee that
attempts to grant or permit the retention of greater rights or authority than is
stated in the trust instrument is void.
(g) The trust instrument shall require that, at least 30 days before making
any distribution to the settlor, as beneficiary, the trustee notify in writing
every person who has a child support judgment or order against the settlor.
The trust instrument shall require that the notice state the date the
distribution will be made and the amount of the distribution.
(h) At the time that the settlor transfers any assets to the trust, the settlor
may not be in default of making a payment due under any child support
judgment or order.
(i) A transfer of assets to the trust may not render the settlor insolvent.

G)

At the time the settlor transfers any assets to the trust, the settlor may
not intend to hinder, delay, or defraud a known creditor by transferring the
assets to the trust. A settlor's expressed intention to protect trust assets from
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the settlor's potential future creditors is not evidence of an intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud a known creditor.
(k) At the time that the settlor transfers any assets to the trust, the settlor
may not be contemplating filing for relief under the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.
(1) Assets transferred to the trust may not be derived from unlawful
activities.
(m) At the time the settlor transfers any assets to the trust, the settlor shall
sign a sworn affidavit stating that:
(i) the settlor has full right, title, and authority to transfer the assets
to the trust;
(ii) the transfer of the assets to the trust will not render the settlor
insolvent;

(iii) the settlor does not intend to hinder, delay, or defraud a known
creditor by transferring the assets to the trust;
(iv) there are no pending or threatened court actions against the
settlor, except for those court actions identified by the settlor on an
attachment to the affidavit;
(v) the settlor is not involved in any administrative proceedings,
except those administrative proceedings identified on an attachment
to the affidavit;
(vi) at the time of the transfer of the assets to the trust, the settlor is
not in default of a child support obligation;
(vii) the settlor does not contemplate filing for relief under the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code; and
(viii) the assets being transferred to the trust were not derived from
unlawful activities.
(6) Failure to satisfy the requirements of Subsection (5) shall result in the
consequences described in this Subsection (6).
(a) If any requirement of Subsections (5)(a) through (g) is not satisfied,
none of the property held in the trust will at any time have the benefit of the
protections described in Subsection (3).
(b) If the trustee does not send the notice required under Subsection ( 5)(g),
the court may authorize any person with a child support judgment or order
against the settlor to whom notice was not sent to attach the distribution or
future distributions, but the person may not:
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(i) satisfy a claim or liability in either law or equity out of the
settlor's transfer to the trust or the settlor's beneficial interest in the
trust; or
(ii) force or require the trustee to make a distribution to the settlor,
as beneficiary.

(c) If any requirement set forth in Subsections (5)(h) through (m) is not
satisfied, the property transferred to the trust that does not satisfy the
requirement may not have the benefit of the protections described in
Subsection (3).
(7) The provisions of Subsection (3) may apply to a trust even if:

(a) the settlor serves as a cotrustee or as an advisor to the trustee, provided
that the settlor may not participate in the determination as to whether a
discretionary distribution will be made;
(b) the settlor has the authority under the terms of the trust instrument to
appoint nonsubordinate advisors or trust protectors who can remove and
appoint trustees and who can direct, consent to, or disapprove distributions;
(c) the settlor has the power under the terms of the trust instrument to serve
as an investment director or to appoint an investment director under Section
75-7-906-,
(d) the trust instrument gives the settlor the power to veto a distribution
from the trust;
C;J

(e) the trust instrument gives the settlor a testamentary nongeneral power
of appointment or similar power;

(f) the trust instrument gives the settlor the right to receive the following
types of distributions:
(i) income, principal, or both in the discretion of a person, including
a trustee, other than the settlor;
(ii) principal, subject to an ascertainable standard set forth in the
trust;

(iii) income or principal from a charitable remainder annuity trust or
charitable remainder unitrust, as defined in 26 U.S.C. 664;
(iv) a percentage of the value of the trust each year as determined
under the trust instrument, but not exceeding the amount that may be
defined as income under 26 U.S.C. 643(b);
(v) the transferor's potential or actual use of real property held under
a qualified personal residence trust, or potential or actual possession
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of a qualified annuity interest, within the meaning of26 U.S.C. 2702
and the accompanying regulations; and
(vi) income or principal from a grantor retained annuity trust or
grantor retained unitrust that is allowed under 26 U.S.C. 2702; or
(g) the trust instrument authorizes the settlor to use real or personal
property owned by the trust.
(8) If a trust instrument contains the provisions described in Subsections (5)(a)
through (g), the transfer restrictions prevent a creditor or other person from
asserting any cause of action or claim for relief against a trustee of the trust or
against others involved in the counseling, drafting, preparation, execution, or
funding of the trust for conspiracy to commit fraudulent conveyance, aiding and
abetting a fraudulent conveyance, participation in the trust transaction, or similar
cause of action or claim for relief. For purposes of this subsection, counseling,
drafting, preparation, execution, or funding of the trust includes the preparation
and funding of a limited partnership, a limited liability company, or other entity if
interests in the entity are subsequently transferred to the trust. The creditor and
other person prevented from asserting a cause of action or claim for relief may
assert a cause of action against, and are limited to recourse against, only:
(a) the trust and the trust assets; and
(b) the settlor, to the extent otherwise allowed in this section.
(9) A cause of action or claim for relief regarding a fraudulent transfer of a
settlor's assets under Subsection (5)0) is extinguished unless the action under
Subsection (5)0) is brought by a creditor of the settlor who was a creditor of the
settlor before the assets referred to in Subsection (5)0) were transferred to the trust
and the action under Subsection (5)0) is brought within the earlier of:

~

~

(a) the later of:
(i) two years after the transfer is made; or

(ii) one year after the transfer is or reasonably could have been discovered
by the creditor if the creditor:

~

(A) can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the creditor
asserted a specific claim against the settlor before the transfer; or
(B) files another action, other than an action under Subsection (5)0),
against the settlor that asserts a claim based on an act or omission of the
settlor that occurred before the transfer, and the action described in this
Subsection (9) is filed within two years after the transfer.

(b)
(i) with respect to a creditor known to the settlor, 120 days after the
date on which notice of the transfer is mailed to the creditor, which
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notice shall state the name and address of the settlor, the name and
address of the trustee, and also describe the assets that were
transferred, but does not need to state the value of those assets if the
assets are other than cash, and which shall inform the creditor that he
is required to present his claim to both the settlor and the trustee
within 120 days from the mailing of the notice or be forever barred;
or

~

(ii) with respect to a creditor not known to the settlor, 120 days after
the date on which notice of the transfer is first published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the settlor
then resides, which notice shall state the name and address of the
settlor, the name and address of the trustee, and also describe the
assets that were transferred, but does not need to state the value of
those assets if the assets are other than cash.
(10) The notice required in Subsection (9)(b) shall be published in accordance
with the provisions of Section 45-1-101 for three consecutive weeks and inform
creditors that they are required to present claims within 120 days from the first
publication of the notice or be forever barred.
(11)
(a) A trust is subject to this section if it is governed by Utah law, as
provided in Section 75-7-107, and if it otherwise meets the requirements of
this section.
(b) A court of this state has exclusive jurisdiction over an action or claim
for relief that is based on a transfer of property to a trust that is the subject
of this section.

viJ
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B. Addendum B: 1953 Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act

25-1-8. When conveyance or assignment void. Every conveyance or assignment, in
writing or otherwise, of any estate or interest in lands, or in goods or things in action, or
of rents or profits issuing therefrom, and every charge upon lands, goods or things in
action or upon the rents or profits thereof, made with intent to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors or other persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands,
and every bond or other evidence of debt given, suits commenced, or decree or judgment
suffered, with the like intent, as against the person hindered, delayed or defrauded shall
be void.
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25-1-9. Defrauding prior or subsequent purchasers-Effect of Notice at time of
purchase. Every conveyance of any estate or interest in lands, or the rents or profits of
lands, and every charge upon lands, or the rents or profits thereof: made or created with
~

intent to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers thereof for a. valuable consideration shall
be void as against such purchasers .. But no such conveyance or charge shall be deemed
fraudulent in favor of a subsequent purchaser who had actual or constructive notice

G,

thereof at the time of his purchase, unless it appears that the grantee in such conveyance,
or the person to be benefited by such charge, was privy to the fraud intended.
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25-1-11. Trust for grantor void. All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or

assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or things in action made in trust for the

~

use of the person making them shall be void as against the existing or subsequent
creditors of such person.

~
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25-1-12. "Creditor," "purchasers" includes heirs. Every conveyance, charge,
instrument or proceeding declared to be void by the provisions of this chapter as against
creditors and purchasers shall be equally void as against heirs, successors, personal
representatives or assigns of such creditors or purchasers.

~
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25-1-15. Rights of creditors with matured claims. Where a conveyance or obligation
is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against
any other person, except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the
fraud at the time of the purchase or one who has derived title immediately or mediately
from such a purchaser:

(I) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary
to satisfy his claim, or,
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy execution upon, the property
conveyed.
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than a fair consideration
for the conveyance or obligation may retain the property or obligation as security for
repayment.
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OLD: 25-1-16. Rights of creditors with claims not matured. Where a conveyance
made or obligation incW"red is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has not matured, he
may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction against any person against whom he
GD

could have proceeded, had his claim matured, and the court may;
( 1) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property;
(2) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property;
(3) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or,
(4) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require.

~
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C. Addendum C: Trial Court's Order and Judgment
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The Order of the Court is stated below: /~/~
Dated: February 26, 2016
Isl AND ~
09:53:06 AM
Distric
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Jennifer P. Lee, #6765
ALDER LAW GROUP
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Phone: (801) 463-2600
FAX: (801) 467-1800
Jennifer@utahtrustattorneys.com

Attorney for the Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH ----PATRICIA PORENTA,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Case Number 08092394

V.

Judge STONE

LOUISE PORENTA, DIAMOND FORK LAND
& LIVESTOCK COMPANY and ROBERT
HENRY COPIER,
Defendants.
(;ii)

The above-captioned case resumed trial on November.23, 2015 before the
Honorable District Court Judge Andrew Stone. Plaintiff Patricia Porenta was present
and was represented by counsel, Jennifer P. Lee and James P. Alder. Defendant
Louise Porenta was present and was represented by counsel, Stephen A. Starr.
Diamond Fork Land and Livestock Company was not present, having defaulted
earlier. Robert Henry Copier was not present and was not represented, having earlier
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defaulted.
This was the conclusion of a trial earlier begun on September 24, 2014 and
January 6, 2015. At this time, the Court examined evidence and heard arguments
pertaining only as to subsequent claims to title and the civil conspiracy claims.
All of those to whom Louise Porenta had purported to transfer an interest in the
real property denied any interest in the property. The individual to whom Defendant
Diamond Fork Land and Livestock Company had purported to transfer an interest in the
real property denied claiming any interest in the property.
The Court, having examined the evidence, heard the arguments and made its
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and being sufficiently advised,
hereby quiets title to Parcel 21-03-177-014, All of lot 6, Taylorsville Gardens, #14,
according to the official plat thereof on file and of-record in the Office of the Salt Lake
County Recorder, State of Utah.
Fee title to the subject property is quieted as follows:

Patricia Porenta, now

known as Patricia Porenta Hansen, is the sole owner of the subject property in fee
simple absolute. Neither Louise Porenta, Robert Henry Copier, the Estate of Robert
Dean Porenta, nor Diamond Fork Land & Livestock Company nor any subsequent or
other transferees or others who may claim an interest through Louise Porenta, Robert
Henry Copier, Diamond Fork Land & Livestock Company or the Estate of Robert Dean
Porenta have any interest whatsoever in this property.
Judgment for attorney fees for bad faith litigation in the fraudulent transfer case is
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awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant Porenta in the total amount of $61,168.50.
Civil conspiracy requires a finding of a "meeting of the minds" to accomplish an
objective. Defendant Porenta's testimony persuaded the court that there was no such
meeting of the minds between her and Robert Copier, but she was the victim of an
unscrupulous, "toxic" attorney who led her to do things without her full understanding.
Therefore, the claim of civil conspiracy is denied.

Approved:

Isl Stephen A. Starr - e-signature with consent of counsel
Stephen A. Starr
Attorney for Defendant Porenta

END OF ORDER
THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE OF THE COURT IS AT THE TOP OF THE
FIRST PAGE OF THIS ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

liv

I hereby certify that on this the 18th day of February, 2016, I caused to be served
a true and complete copy of the foregoing document, via the court's e-filing system to:
Stephen A. Starr
Attorney for Louise Porenta
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D. Addendum D: Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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In the District Court of Utah
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

GllJ

PATRICIA K. PORENTA,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OFLAW

vs.
LOUISE PORENTA, DIAMOND FORK
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, and
ROBERT HENRY COPIER,

Civil No. 080923394
Judge Andrew Stone

Defendant
The above-captioned case came on for trial on September 24, 2014 and January 6,

~

2015 before Judge Andrew Stone. Plaintiff Patricia Porenta ("Patricia" or "Plaintiff") was
present and was represented by counsel, Jennifer P. Lee. Defendant Louise Porenta
("Louise" or "Defendant") was present and was represented by counsel, Stephen A.
Starr and Douglas Short.
This case has too long a history. The docket is a monument to obstruction and delay. At
its heart, though, this case is a simple one. Patricia and Robert Porenta ("Robert'') were
going through a divorce. Robert moved back in with his mother Louise. As was her
practice, Louise supported her adult son, including paying his attorney's fees in the
divorce. With her son and his attorney (Defendant Copier), Louise needed a way to get
money out of the marital estate and into Copier's hands. They decided to re-

~

characterize her past support as "loans11 in order to justify Robert in deeding away his
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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interest in the marital home, 99% to Louise and 1% to himself and Louise. The specific
plan was to sever the joint tenancy. Robert died in 2008. Patricia discovered the
transfer near the same time. Patricia and Louise have been fighting over the modest
house ever since.
Copier and his successors in representing Louise, insistent that he'd come upon a
bullet-proof means of draining the marital estate without court authority, have filed
countless motions asserting that the scheme does not implicate the fraudulent transfer
act, that the Court is statutorily powerless to restore the joint tenancy, and variations on
those themes.
The transfer was plainly fraudulent. The Court plainly has the power to set it aside. The
fact that the parties have taken seven years to get to this result is absurd.
The Court incorporates its prior memoranda decisions regarding its power under the
statute, as well as its recognition that Plaintiff's Complaint adequately states a claim
under either section of Utah Code Ann.§ 25-6-6, and that that section is not
~

unconstitutional. The Court denies Defendant's Motion to Amend her Answer, as being
untimely-Louise was at all times on notice of her insider status~ and was required to
plead the one-year statute of limitations specifically. She therefore waived that defense
long ago. In any event, such an amendment would be futile, as it is clear that the
transfer was concealed and should be tolled as to Patricia until her discovery of it.

~
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After hearing the testimony of the witnesses and examining the evidence
presented, the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
· 1. On September 26, 1997, Patricia and Robert Porenta purchased a home, Parcel 2103-177-014 (the "Property"), as joint tenants.
2. After approximately seventeen years of marriage, Plaintiff filed for divorce on
November 10, 2005.
3. A creditor-debtor relationship arose between Plaintiff and Robert with the filing of the
divorce action.
4. Robert attempted unsuccessfully to have the divorce court order the Property sold.
5. Thereafter, on October 10, 2006, Robert executed and recorded a Quit Claim Deed
in which he conveyed an undivided 99/100th share of the property to Defendant "as a
tenant in common" and an undivided 011100th share to himself and Defendant "as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship." ( the "Transfer.")
6. The Transfer occurred approximately nine months after Plaintiff filed for divorce.
7. At the time of the Transfer, Robert was under court order to pay child support and to
pay one half of his children's medical expenses. Judgment had already been
entered against him for his failure to make such payments and, at the time of the
Transfer, a hearing was pending on a second motion for contempt and to establish
the arrearage owed by Robert for failing to pay his child support obligations for the
previous nine months.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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8. Although Defendant claims that the Transfer was in satisfaction of an antecedent
debt, she has provided no documentary evidence of the existence, amount or nature
Gj

of the debt or when it was allegedly incurred. She did offer copies of approximately
$31,000 in checks written on her account and that of others.
9. It is not disputed that Louise often provided financial support to Patricia and Robert
during their marriage. Defendant provided no evidence, other than her own
testimony, of any agreement to repay the alleged loans. Patricia, who the Court
found credible, testified there was no such agreement.
10. Defendant is Robert's mother, an "insider" under the definition given in the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act at UCA 25-5-2(7) and (11 ).
11. After the Transfer, Robert continued to represent to Plaintiff and the divorce court
that the property was still within the jurisdiction of the court.
12.At no point during the divorce proceedings did Robert disclose that he had made the
Transfer, despite the fact that property distribution remained at issue before the
court and Robert continued to represent that the property would be available for
division or allocation at trial.
13. In the Spring of 2008, Plaintiff discovered the Transfer through her own research in
efforts to establish the value of the real property.
14. On September 9, 2008, Robert Porenta died.
15. Less than two weeks after the Transfer, at a hearing in the divorce case on October
19, 2006, judgment was entered against Robert for child support and medical
support obligations incurred before the Transfer. At that hearing, Robert asserted
that he was unable to pay because of lack of income or other source of funds.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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16. At the time of the Transfer, Robert reasonably should have believed that he would
incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due, as he was under orders of
the court to pay child support (base support and medical support) and had been

II.)

unable to pay the monthly payments as they became due. Also, he knew that he
would continue to incur attorney fees for his divorce case.
17. At the time of the Transfer, Defendant had reason to believe that Robert was

~

insolvent, as Robert lived with her and was her tenant at the time of the Transfer,
and she had been paying his child support obligations, attorney fees and living
~

expenses for him because he was unable to pay.
18. Defendant claims that the Transfer of the property was in partial satisfaction of loans
totaling more than $200,000.00 and dating back more than 25 years. She could not
give the exact number of the loans and her only proof of an agreement to repay the
loans was her own testimony, which was contradicted by her testimony that she
made payments to Robert or on his behalf with the expectation of assuring herself a
place to live in her old age and that these were characterized as "loans" after the
divorce was filed. It is clear that Defendant repeatedly supported Robert and
Patricia during their marriage, gifting them money and personal property, without any
legal obligation of repayment. Robert would respond by doing odd jobs for
Defendant, and by taking her on trips.
19. As discussed below, Defendant also claimed multiple items of personal property,
held by Plaintiff as her own for many years yet never demanded by Defendant until
the filing of this action. Defendant was wholly un-credible in attempting to establish
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these debts of money and personal property. Thus the Court also discounts her
testimony regarding the supposed loans.
20. Robert owed no antecedent debt to Defendant. Because Defendant is an insider,
she bears the burden of proving, by "clear and satisfactory evidence" that the debt
she alleges was genuine, that her purpose was honest and that she acted in good
faith in this Transfer. Paxton v. Paxton, 15 P.2d 1051, 5056-7 {Utah 1932). She has
failed to carry this burden of proof, presenting no evidence whatsoever regarding
any agreement to repay the alleged "loans" and no credible evidence of the transfer
or delivery of money constituting such "loans" except for photocopies of
approximately $30,000 in checks from her and others to Robert or third parties.
21.At the time of the Transfer, Robert's debts included the mortgage on the real
property, which was approximately $66,000 Gointly and severally with Plaintiff), a
child support arrearage and half of the $40,000 in marital debts.
22. At the time of the Transfer, Robert had no assets of significant value except for the
property that was transferred.
23. If not for the Transfer, Plaintiff would be the sole owner of the subject property as a
result of the death of Robert, the joint tenant.
24. Defendant's counterclaim for return of personal property is unsupported by any
evidence but Defendant's disputed testimony. She failed to carry the burden of
proof that Plaintiff has any item of personal property that belongs to her.
25. Defendant presented no evidence other than her disputed testimony that she owned
property that she later demanded Plaintiff return to her. Much of the property, by
Defendant's own testimony, belonged to others from whom Defendant felt that she
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page6

should have inherited the property. The burden of proof was upon Defendant to
prove that she did, in fact, inherit the property and that it had not earlier been gifted
out of the estate of the deceased. Defendant's disputed testimony is not credible and
is not "a preponderance of the evidence" and falls short of her burden of proof.
26. Defendant presented no evidence other than her testimony that much of the property
she demanded returned to her was in Plaintiff's possession. Plaintiff disputed this

~

testimony, testifying that that Robert had taken some of the property, which
belonged to him and not to Defendant, in the divorce action. Defendant's disputed
testimony is not "a preponderance of the evidence" and falls short of her burden of
proof.
27. No property item that Defendant demanded returned to her was supported by both
evidence that the property belonged to Defendant and that Plaintiff had the property.
Many of the items were past gifts by Defendant to Plaintiff by her own admission,
and she now simply wanted them back.
28. Defendant presented no evidence other than her disputed testimony that she owned
property for which she demanded cash damages. Much of the property, by
Defendant's own testimony, belonged to others from whom Defendant felt that she
should have inherited the property. .The burden of proof was upon Defendant to
prove that she did, in fact, inherit the property and that it had not earlier been gifted
out of the estate of the deceased, or gifted by Defendant directly to Robert or
Patricia. Defendant's disputed testimony is not "a preponderance of the evidence"
and falls short of her burden of proof.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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29. Defendant claimed an adjustable bed was "lent" to Robert and Patricia. She

acknowledges giving it to them for their use, but apparently now wants to re-claim it.
Similarly, a round wood table and a lamp. a projection screen for slides. a bedside
table, a sofa, a hutch, a massage chair, a book shelf case, family Yugoslavian
cookbooks, dishes from Japan, baking pans, cast iron pans, a Lord's Supper picture,
antique washboards, a Christmas reindeer with sled and a garage-sale list of other
items-all were claimed to have been "lent" to Patricia and Robert during the
marriage and now Louise wants them back. This hodge-podge of unsupported
property claims illustrates a disturbing pattern: Louise feels entitled to anything
contributed by her to the couple, now that Patricia filed for divorce and Robert has
died. The similarity of these unsupported and frivolous claims for conversion of
personal property to Louise's core claim that hundreds of thousands of dollars worth
of undocumented "loans" of money now justify claiming half of Patricia's home is
obvious and compelling.
30. Defendant presented no evidence other than her testimony that much of the property
for which she demanded cash damages was in Plaintiff's possession. Plaintiff
disputed this testimony, testifying that that Robert had taken some of the property,
which belonged to him and not to Defendant, in the divorce action. Defendant's
disputed testimony is not "a preponderance of the evidence" and falls short of her

burden of proof.
31. For the few personal property items that Plaintiff admitted were in her possession,
Defendant failed to establish a reliable cash value for any property and had no
evidence except for her own, disputed, testimony that the property belonged to her.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Again, Defendant's efforts to arbitrarily assign value to these· items of personal
property seriously undermined her credibility.
32. Delivery of these items of personal property, their undisturbed possession by
Patricia and/or Robert of them for years since then, coupled with Patricia's
testimony, establishes clearly and convincingly that the items were gifted to Patricia
and Robert by Louise or others.

~

33. Besides addressing the factual allegations of the Complaint, Defendant's Answer
asserted seven (7) defenses: validity of Defendant's interest in the real property,
failure to join an indispensable party, failure to state a claim, lack of subject matter

~

jurisdiction, preclusion because of dismissal of the divorce action, denial of the
averments of the Complaint going to actual intent and an argument that the
appropriate remedy was reversion to Robert's estate. All of these defenses except
the denial of actual intent were brought in the form of various motions to dismiss and
all of them were rejected by the court as "meritless" and even "barely colorable."
34. Defendant's defenses in this case are meritless and have been found meritless and
"barely colorable" repeatedly throughout the case.
35. Defendant's defenses in this case were brought in bad faith, as she intended to take
unconscionable advantage of Plaintiff by hindering or delaying restoration of the
property to Plaintiff and/or to create such a financial burden of attorney fees that
Plaintiff would abandon the case.
36. Defendant's defenses in this case were brought in bad faith, as she lacked an
honest belief in the propriety of the Transfer. Her defense that the Transfer was in
consideration of "loans" to Robert during her lifetime was contrived before the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Transfer, necessary only because she, Robert and the attorney advising them,
Robert Henry Copier, all knew that the Transfer was a fraudulent transfer to avoid
Plaintiff's claims. The ledger of loans relied upon exclusively by Defendant to
support her claims (she was unable to independently recall any single transaction)
was, by her own admission, constructed long after the fact at Copier's direction.
37. On September 16, 2014, Defendant executed a Quit Claim Deed purporting to
transfer "all" of the subject property to Diamond Fork Land & Livestock Company,
subject to a $600 reservation and a provision entitling Defendant to regain the
property by paying her attorney fees to Robert Henry Copier.

Defendant identified

Diamond Fork Land & Livestock Company as "Robert Copier's company."
38. The transfer to Diamond Fork Land & Livestock Company was done in anticipation
of a trial.
39. The transfer to Diamond Fork Land & Livestock Company was an attempt to transfer
the subject property beyond the jurisdiction of the court to avoid the remedy sought
by Plaintiff, quieting title of the land in her name alone. Again, this transfer seriously
undermines Defendant's credibility.
40. Defendant did not disclose the transfer to Diamond Fork Land & Livestock Company
to the Court.
41. Instead, at trial on September 24, 2014, Defendant testified that she claimed a
49.5% ownership interest in the subject property, concealing the fact that she had
transferred all of her interest barely a week earlier.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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42. Defendant's false testimony on September 24, 2014 was deceitful and was intended
to mislead the Court and Plaintiff and to prevent the court from granting the remedy
sought by Plaintiff.

From the foregoing FACTS, the Court makes the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A creditor-debtor relationship existed between Robert and Plaintiff at the

time of the Transfer.
2.

The creditor-debtor relationship, and Plaintiff's claim against Robert, arose

when Plaintiff filed for divorce on November 10, 2005.
3.

Robert was insolvent at the time of the Transfer, as his debts exceeded

his assets and he was unable to pay his debts as they became due.
4.

11

Defendant is an insider'' under the definition given in the Utah Fraudulent

Transfer Act at UCA 25-5-2(7) and (11 ).
5.

The Transfer was not for equivalent value, as Defendant gave no

consideration in exchange. Defendant claimed that consideration consisted of
forgiveness of an unidentified number of "loans" to Robert over a 25 year period
preceding the Transfer. A "loan" requires both delivery of money and an agreement to
repay the money and the Defendant must bear the burden of proving both elements of a
loan.

She has failed to carry this burden of proof, offering little beyond her disputed

testimony to show the delivery of money and nothing but her own testimony as evidence
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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of an agreement to repay the "loans." The circumstances that she described, an
undefined number of "loans" over a 25 year period, constantly increasing without ariy
payments whatsoever, seriously undermined her claim of any "meeting of the mindsn for
repayment. In fact, her testimony was contradictory, with Defendant repeatedly
testifying that there was an agreement to repay but also testifying that the expected
"repayment" was to be made by providing her with a place to stay in her old age and the
decision to make "repayment" in money did not take place until after the divorce was
filed.
The burden of proof was upon Defendant, as an insider, to prove that the loans
were genuine and that her purpose was honest in making the loans. She did not carry
this burden of proof, as she submitted no evidence of any agreement to repay "loans"
and she provided little evidence of any loans except for her own testimony, a "ledger'
that was created at the time of the Transfer to justify the Transfer, and copies of
approximately $31,000 in checks from her own account and others to Robert or third
parties. Defendant's evidence and testimony fell far short of the "clear and satisfactory
evidence" required by Paxton v. Paxton, 15 P.2d 1051, 1056-7 (Utah 1992).
6.

The Transfer was a fraudulent transfer under UCA § 25-6-6(1 }. The claim

arose before the Transfer, was for much less than reasonably equivalent value and
0l

Robert was insolvent at the time of the Transfer.
7.

In addition, the Transfer was a fraudulent transfer under UCA § 25-6-6(2).

The Transfer was a "fraudulent transfer' because it was consideration for an antecedent
debt, Plaintiff's claim arose before the Transfer and Robert was insolvent at the time of
the Transfer.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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8.

Finally, the Transfer was a fraudulent transfer under UCA § 25-6-5

because it was made with actual intent to defraud, hinder or delay Plaintitrs claim
against Robert. Evidence of fraudulent intent include such "badges of fraud" as
Robert's insolvency, the transfer of Robert's only significant asset and Defendant's
status as an "insider." The timing of the Transfer, during the pendency of a divorce
action and barely two weeks before judgment was granted to Plaintiff and against

~

Robert in that divorce action for failure to pay his child support obligations, also strongly
suggests that the Transfer was motivated in large part by the divorce and Robert's
intent to avoid claims by Plaintiff. Robert's misleading statements to the divorce court
indicating that his unpaid child support obligations would be satisfied with his share of
the home equity further attests to fraudulent intent.
9.

The Transfer was a fraudulent transfer under UCA § 25-6-5 because

Robert received less than reasonably equivalent value from Defendant for the Transfer
and Robert reasonably believed that he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay as
they became due. At the time of the Transfer, Defendant was not paying his child
support obligations as they became due, his mother was paying his attorney fees and
he was asking for alimony in the divorce case because his income was insufficient for
his living expenses.
10.

If not for the fraudulent transfer, the joint tenancy of Robert and Plaintiff

would not have been severed and Plaintiff would have become the sole owner of the
subject property upon Robert's death. Plaintiffs claim against Defendant at the time of
the Transfer encompassed the whole of the marital estate, including the right to
preserve the joint tenancy or require Robert to convey his interest free and clear to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Patricia. The joint tenancy itself was a marital asset that Robert could not unilaterally
dissipate while the divorce was pending. Thus the 11extent necessary to satisfy"
Patricia's nascent claims that were created by the filing of the divorce action is to
entirely set aside the Transfer. It is thus fair, just and appropriate under the
circumstances that this Court decree that Plaintiff is the sole owner of the subject
property in fee simple absolute and that neither Defendant nor any subsequent
transferees have any interest whatsoever in this property.
11.

Defendant has filed at least sixty motions during the pendency of this

Gj

case, many of them repeating previously denied motions, and nearly all with "little or no
citation to legal authority, and little if any real analysis of the legal arguments." Nearly
all were denied or withdrawn by Defendant.
12.

Defendant's defenses in this case are meritless, without basis in law or

fact and repeatedly submitted to the Court with little or no legal basis or substantive
analysis.
13.

Defendant's defenses were brought in bad faith, made with the intention of

hindering or delaying restoration of the property to Plaintiff or forcing Plaintiff to abandon
her case because of the legal fees required by Defendant's paperwork blizzard for
repetitive, baseless, unsupported motions.
14.

Defendant's counter-claim was meritless, without basis in law or fact and

for no true purpose other than retaliation for the suit brought against her. She countersued for payment of loans" that she knew were fabricated and/or were gifts that she re11

characterized as "loans" only to justify the Transfer, and sued for return of property that
had never belonged to her or that had been given to Plaintiff or others as gifts years
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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ago. Her counter-claim should be dismissed, with Defendant taking nothing thereby.
15.

Defendant should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for attorney fees

incurred in prosecution of this case and in defense against Defendant's counterclaim.

16.

Plaintiff should prepare an appropriate judgment, and submit an affidavit

for her attorney fees. Subject to a determination of any objection to such fees by
Defendant, the judgment will be augmented in the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees
for the pursuit of this action and defense of the counterclaims. These findings and
conclusions will serve as an order denying Defendant's Motion to Amend her Answer.

/-'~
Dated this _l.p_day of May, 2015

An
.
Third District J
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